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RECENT LEGISLATION 
LEGISLATION-FUTURE INTERESTS-EXTINGUISHMENT OF CONTINGENT RE-
MAINDER INTERESTS IN THE UNBORN-Under the somewhat misleading title of 
"An Act To Permit the Dissolution of Estates Tail and To Permit the Con-
veyance of Contingent Remainder Interest and To Provide Procedure 
Therefor," Arkansas has enacted legislation which partially revitalizes an 
ancient common law rule that other legislatures and courts have been try-
ing to eliminate for some hundred and fifty years-the doctrine of the de-
structibility of contingent remainders.1 Arkansas' Act 1632 is thus unique 
among the modern statutes designed to increase the alienability of estates 
fettered with outstanding future interests.3 The particular problem of 
alienability which prompted the act arises from this typical situation: 
an owner of land, 0, makes a conveyance "To B and the heirs of his 
body." At common law, this would have created a fee tail estate in B. 
, An Arkansas statute4 enacted in 1837, however, precludes the creation 
of fee tail estates and decrees that any grant or devise of this nature shall 
be converted into a life estate in the first taker, with a remainder in fee 
simple to the issue of the life tenant. Thus, B would receive a life 
estate, and his children, C and D, a remainder in fee. But this remainder 
has long been interpreted by the Arkansas courts as contingent upon 
1 See SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §209 (1956) for historical analysis. 
2 Ark. Acts 1957, No. 163. 
s For a comprehensive citation of authority relating to each, see 2 PowELL, REAL 
PROPERTY §292 (1950). See also SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS 
IN LAND 169-173 (1953). 
4 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §50-405. 
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survivorship,5 rather than vested, and since Arkansas is one of the few 
states in which contingent remainders are not alienable,6 this estate 
has become unmarketable by ordinary conveyance. Even if C and D 
join with B in conveying title by warranty deed and thereby estop them-
selves from asserting ownership when the remainder subsequently vests,7 
a grantee still has valid grounds for rejecting the title as unmarketable.8 
But under Act 163 this fettered estate will now be substantially emanci-
pated. Applicable retroactively,9 the act provides that if the grantor, 0, 
the life tenant, B, and all living persons who may possibly take as re-
maindermen, C and D, join in a conveyance, their grantee receives title 
in fee simple.10 The title of the act is thus misleading in that it says nothing 
about the destruction of contingent remainders; yet under the above 
procedure the interests of all unborn remaindermen are clearly des-
troyed. Indeed, it is this aspect of the act which seems to constitute its 
basic purpose. If the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent re-
mainders were in effect in Arkansas,11 then B, the life tenant, could 
have conveyed to O, the holder of the reversion, and thus merged their 
two estates. This would have caused the destruction of the remainder in-
terests in B's issue. A similar merger would result if B and O joined in a 
conveyance to any third party. In a limited way, this is precisely what 
the statute appears to authorize. However, the fact that all living re-
maindermen are required to join might be a good indication that the 
destructibility rule as such did not exist in Arkansas. Also, because of 
ambiguities in construction,12 the act need not be limited to the typical 
situation presented above. · 
As a model solution to the problem of alienability, the merit of 
Act 163 is doubtful. This is so, first, because of the act's restricted area of 
5 Horsley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458 (1884); Hutchison v. Sheppard, 225 Ark. 14, 279 
S.W. (2d) 33 (1955). 
6 Hurst v. Hilderbrandt, 178 Ark. 337, IO s:w. (2d) 491 (1928). See generally 2 ARK. 
L. REv. 87 (1948). 
7 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §50-404; Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 
210 S.W. (2d) 284 (1948). 
8 There may be issue born to B after the conveyance (in Arkansas a person is deemed 
capable of procreation until death) who would have a right to participate in the remain-
der. Or, the children, C and D, might predecease B, causing the remainder to vest in B's 
grandchildren at B's death. See Peebles v. Garland, 221 Ark. 185, 252 S.W. (2d) 396 
(1952). 
9 Ark. Acts 1957, No. 163, §2. 
10 See id., §1. 
11 There is apparently no authority in the state on this point except Le Sieur v. 
Spikes, 117 Ark. 366, 175 S.W. 413 (1915), which avoided application of the doctrine by 
construction, and in effect made the doctrine inoperative in Arkansas. 
12 Does "conveyance" include devise, or is the act applicable only .to inter vivos con-
veyances? Does "grantor" include devisor or successors of a deceased grantor who now 
ihold the reversion, or is the act applicable only so long as the grantor therein is living? 
Does "or to other contingent remaindermen" refer to all contingent remainders, or 
only those created simultaneously with a limitation to heirs of the body? 
474 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
effective applicability. Should the word "grantor," as used in the statute, 
be narrowly construed to mean only O, the original grantor, and not 
his heirs who would hold the reversion, then at O's death the statute 
is no longer operative.13 Also, there can be no conveyance without the 
assent of all the parties. Indeed, whenever a remainder, either contingent 
or vested, is created after a life estate, practical alienability is somewhat 
abridged for the life of the life tenant because of the difficulty in arriv-
ing at an acceptable division of the proceeds. Further, it would be a 
rare occasion when one of the remaindermen is not a minor.14 In 
such instances, conveyance of the fee simple is necessarily delayed by 
judicial proceedings for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Patently, 
the advantage of Act 163 in its simplicity and swiftness of procedure 
is then partially nullified. Secondly, in view of the available alternative 
methods for accomplishing identical results, the necessity of an act of 
such far-reaching impact is questionable. Under Arkansas law when 
alienation is desired to promote the best use of the land or to protect 
the economic interests of all the parties involved, the court of equity 
may be petitioned for an order approving the sale of the contingent re-
mainder estate.15 This procedure has the additional advantage of protect-
ing the remaindermen not in esse since a share of the sale's proceeds is 
held in trust for those who will ultimately constitute vested remainder-
men upon the death of the life tenant. In cases involving minors16 
this course is almost as simple as the one required under the act, but 
has the advantage of being just. On the other hand, if the legislature 
intended to relieve the parties from a burdensome court procedure re-
quiring affirmative proof that a present sale will be necessarily advan-
tageous, the act could have contained an additional provision allow-
ing the court to approve the conveyance on the mere grounds of ex-
pediency or desire, and requiring the appointment of a trustee for in-
vestment and distribution of the proceeds. Such a statutory provision 
would not be unique to Arkansas in the area of future interests11 and 
is utilized in several other states.18 Again the interest of the unborn 
would be protected with but minimum burden on alienation. Finally, 
if the real purpose of Act 163 is to create a substitute for fine and common 
recovery, the simplest and most direct procedure would be the repeal of 
the earlier estate tail statute. Ever since Taltarum's Case19 alienation 
13 On the other hand, should it be interpreted to mean the holder of the reversion, 
a conveyance -would deviate from O's intent, as evidenced by his conveyance, to have the 
after-born participate. 
14 B's grandchildren as well as his children are contingent remaindermen and pre-
sumably must join in the conveyance. 
15 Walker v. Blaney, 225 Ark. 918, 286 S.W. (2d) 479 (1956). 
16" ••• (.E]quity :has jurisdiction ... to order ••• the sale ... even if one of the 
remaindermen is a minor." Id. at 921. 
11 See Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §53-309. 
18 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §292, p. 546 (1950). But see id. at 542. 
19Y. B. 12 Edw. IV, 19 (1472). 
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in fee simple by the tenant in tail has been an accepted incident of the 
estate tail.20 
One further problem remains: is the act constitutional? Does the oc-
casional sale that will be facilitated justify the general authorization to 
destroy the interests of the unborn remaindermen? It is generally conceded 
that expectancy interests are within the control of the legislature,21 and 
various interests may often be constitutionally extinguished.22 Moreover, 
the constitutional question in Arkansas will be primarily influenced by 
the case of Love v. McDonald,23 which held that contingent remainders 
in property upon which the life tenant desires to place an oil or gas 
lease may be abolished under statute if part of the lease proceeds are 
held for those in whom the estate will vest on death of the life tenant. 
The opinion broadly stated in addition that contingent remainders 
were mere expectancies which were offered no constitutional protec-
tion.24 Whether such contingent remainders are of sufficiently substan-
tial character, however, to be given constitutional protection depends 
not upon their classification as vested or contingent, but upon other 
factors.25 Even though numerous statutes authorize the sale of property 
as a means of unfettering estates, and have been sustained as a proper 
exercise of sovereign and paternal power,26 the power upheld in the 
area of contingent remainders has been one not of extinction but of 
commutation. When courts hold that such interests are within the con-
trol of the legislature they generally mean that the legislature may com-
pel the holder of an interest in land to accept as a substitute a corres-
ponding interest in the proceeds from a sale of the land.27 Indeed, this 
is one of the grounds upon which the opinion in Love v. McDonald can be 
20 See 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §196, p. 72 (1950); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §79, and 
special note (1936). 
21 E.g., Lee v. Albro, 91 Ore. 211, 178 P. 784 (1919). 
22 See McNeer v. McNeer, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N.E. 681 (1892) (upholding legislation ret-
roactively affecting rights of dower and curtesy); 19 L.R.A. 256 (1892). See also 19 
L.R.A. 247 (1892). But the case of Tatum v. Tatum, 174 Ark. 110, 295 S.W. 720 (1927), 
in which the right of a contingent remainderman was said to be similar to the inchoate 
right of dower, should not ,be inadvisedly seized upon to substantiate a possible deter-
mination that the protectable attributes of the former are no greater than the latter. 
23 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W. (2d) 170 (1941). 
24 The court, while recognizing that these estates have possible value, concluded that 
contingent remainders were not property within the contemplation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 889. Accord: Anderson v. Wilkins, 142 N.C. 154, 55 S;E. 272 (1906); 
Stanback v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 197 N.C. 292, 148 S.E. 313 (1929). Contra: Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Hoppin, (7th Cir. 1914) 214 F. 928; Green v. Edwards, 31 R.I. 1, 77 A. 188 (1910). 
25 See SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §136 (1956). One such factor is the 
recognition that the interest involved is one of probable substantial value, created by 
words of purchase and not limitation, and that its destruction must be balanced against 
the need for extinguishment in furthering the statutory policy. 
26 See e.g., Geary v. Butts, 84 W. Va. 348, 99 S.E. 492 (1919). 
27 Geary v. Butts, note 26 supra; Lee v. Albro, note 21 supra; Anderson v. Wilkins, 
note 24 supra. See also 33 IOWA L. REv. 692 at 700 (1948); SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLA-
TION .AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND 169-173 (1953). 
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criticized.28. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Act 163 is a good deal 
more tenuous than that of the statute under consideration in that 
case.29 Moreover, the fettering that is involved here is not to continue 
for more than the period of one life.30 But having decided that the free-
ing of estates for alienation demanded a summary extinguishment of 
contingent remainders, Arkansas, by the passage of Act 163, has ap-
parently taken a step backward in the field of real property law. The 
question for the Arkansas court now, however, will not be that "of 
choosing between alternative methods of handling the problems created 
by these interests, but the reasonableness of the method chosen by the 
General Assembly."s1 
Edward B. Stulberg 
28 The court was passing upon the constitutionality of a similar act empowering life 
tenants of estates originally conveyed in tail to execute oil and gas leases. Ark. Stat. Ann. 
(1947) §53-302. However, this act explicitly required the appointment by a court of a 
trustee to hold and invest the proceeds for the benefit of all contingent remaindermen. 
Thus, there was no extinguishment. Also, an argument can ,be reasonably made that the 
court's statement as to the destructibility of contingent remainders was but dictum, the 
act being justified under the police power to protect oil and gas reserves from depletion. 
See SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION .AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND 188 (1953). 
29 While Act 163 was passed on grounds of convenience, the other statute was adopted 
under circumstances of urgency to allow immediate access to oil and gas reserves, and yet 
that legislature found it still appropriate to require protection of the unborn through 
representation. 
so Whether or not this works an undue hardship on alienation can be inferred from 
a comparison with the rule against perpetuities, which represents the usual public policy 
against alienation and permits a .fettering for longer than a single life. 
31 Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. (2d) 486 at 493, 130 N.E. (2d) 111 (1955). 
